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Involuntary Hospitalization & Treatability: Observations




There is abroad today a strong current of feeling that involuntary hospitali-
zation for mental illness is an oppressive procedure based on specious criteria
which cannot be justified on the basis of evidence of its value or morality,
and which may be malevolently directed against the creative activity of mi-
nority and dissident elements of our society.' Yet, though under attack, it
goes on. An involuntary 'hospitalization occurs about six times a day in the
District of Columbia and about 1,000 -times a day in the United States.2
Dealing with those presumed to be mentally ill in this way has been a com-
mon practice for many years and in many societies. Is it possible
that rather than being a disappearing anachronism it fills a real need and
that it 'has positive aspects as well as the negative ones put forth by civil
liberties advocates and the new breed of antipsychiatrists? If this is so, and
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Involuntary Hospitalization
if the thousands of people who initiate the process believe that they are do-
ing something useful and necessary, it seems odd that so little has appeared
in print in support of involuntary hospitalization. It will be the purpose of
this paper to attempt to make the case for involuntary hospitalization, to
explore some of the reasons why we believe it should not be phased out,
and to advance suggestions about criteria which will allow psychiatrists to
exercise the skills for which they have been trained in the service of patients
whose illnesses have deprived them of the ability to make rational judgments
about their best interests.
The Current Legal Anomaly
First we need to describe involuntary hospitalization. In the District of Co-
lumbia, it comes about as the result of a sequence of events beginning with
a concerned citizen, police or mental health professional who initiates a pro-
cedure that involves two independent evaluations of whether an individual
meets the criteria of being both mentally ill and likely to injure himself or
others. If these criteria are met, the person is transported to D.C. General
Hospital or Saint Elizabeth's Hospital. Ordinarily, he will be in a ward with
fifteen or forty other patients, but if he is too disturbed for the ward com-
munity he is placed in a room by himself. Initially ithe patient has no freedom
to leave the ward although this restriction may be lifted in as little as a
week's time. Therapy consists primarily of medication, psychotherapy and
other forms of interactions with 'the staff. Electric shock is used when pre-
scribed but in practice is infrequent and-to our knowledge-psycho-
surgery has not been used on any emergency patients in the last year and
has been extremely rare in any event for the past twenty years. For the pa-
tient, there are many unpleasant aspects to involuntary hospitalization. The
displacement from community to institution, the intrusions into one's personal
life .by strangers, the initial sense of isolation experienced by many, the regi-
mentation of ward life, the sense of shame and guilt and failure, the psycho-
logical discomforts which may go along with psychotherapy, and the physi-
cal discomforts of psychopharmacology-all these are undeniable discom-
forts which can be diminished but not eliminated. For most patients, this
experience lasts several weeks, although a few stay only for a day or two
and a very small number-maybe one in a thousand-remain for many
years. Less than one percent are changed from emergency to committed
status (this occurs after thirty days in the hospital-when it occurs) whereas
more than 99 per cent are discharged or changed to voluntary status.3
3. See H. SILVERBURo, supra note 2.
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Granted that an involuntary hospitalization is at least an unpleasant ex-
perience for many patients, are there any positive results for them and for
the public? An exact answer is not available since there are no controlled
experiments that would clarify what would happen if psychiatric involuntary
hospitalization were not available. No one maintains that in each instance
disastrous results would have ensued if the patient had remained at liberty.
Undoubtedly there is substance to the charges that psychiatrists are prone
to over-predict dangerousness directed towards other persons. There is also
little reason to question that at least some homicides and severe assaults
have been avoided by involuntary hospitalization. It should be pointed out,
however, that the thrust of the criticism that psychiatrists lack exceptional
ability in predicting dangerousness is blunted by the fact that two-thirds of
the patients are not hospitalized because of dangerousness to others
but rather on the basis of the threat they pose to themselves. 4  We do not
hear charges that over-prediction of a suicidal danger is a problem in the
way that prediction of dangerousness to others is. Taking into account all
of the probabilities and uncertainties, we believe it can be stated positively
that a certain amount of physical harm to the patient himself and to other
people is prevented by involuntary hospitalization. In the case of self dam-
age this includes not only potential suicides but also the larger group of pa-
tients with symptoms of mental disorders accompanying physical disease,
such as intoxications due to various agents, particularly alcohol.
It is our belief, however, that the case for involuntary hospitalization does
not depend only on avoidance of physical damage. It may be a beneficial
experience in ways which go beyond the saving of the patient's own life or
the 'lives of others. An indication that patients also feel this way is the fact
that about 50 per cent of readmissions of patients previously hospitalized in-
voluntarily are on a voluntary basis." We also point out the problems,
sometimes passed over too lightly, of turning over the responsibility for dis-
turbed people to inadequately prepared relatives, friends and community.
Anyone who believes 'that placement in the community is always a satisfac-
tory answer is ignoring present reality.
We do not intend to suggest by any means that involuntary hospitalization
is a panacea. Sometimes it does not work either for the patient or for the
community: this may be the fault of the constraints presented by the pres.
ent criteria which allow for continued involuntary hospitalization only on the
basis of dangerousness. For example, a man is involuntarily hospitalized
4. This figure was obtained from patient flow files kept by Mr. Idella von Loetzen




for the reason that he is both mentally ill and dangerous to others. After
a week or two of observation, the staff comes to the decision that he is cer-
tainly mentally ill but cannot be considered dangerous. Under present law
he must be released even though there has been no alteration in his mental
status and-as far as anyone can tell-he is not better -for -the experience.
A possible remedy for this kind of situation, which occurs in less than 5
per cent of emergency hospitalizations, 6 will be discussed later. Another and
larger group for which hospitalization is of questionable value includes pa-
tients who were hospitalized as dangerous to themselves because of organic
problems such as confusion and disorientation. Although their mental status
may not have improved during hospitalization, it is possible that this pe-
riod may have been indirectly beneficial to them by giving time for mobiliza-
tion of resources for their care in the community through the efforts of
the hospital, relatives, or the public defender. We would submit that pa-
tients in this category were well served by involuntary hospitalization even
though the patient's own ability to function was unchanged. Parenthetically,
sometimes the major benefit a person obtains from involuntary hospitaliza-
tion is in the form of legal services that would not have otherwise come his
way.
Although there are of course patients who simply do not benefit in any
way from -being hospitalized, it is our impression that three out of four pa-
tients who are involuntarily hospitalized in the District of Columbia have
improved in one way or another in their ability to live in the community as
a result of their hospital experience. 7 In spite of this evidence of beneficial
results, pressure has been growing to narrow even further the criteria for
involuntary hospitalization. We suggest that this is unwise, and that the in-
ability to bring about involuntary hospitalization of certain individuals is re-
sponsible for needless suffering by themselves and their families.
As an example, we cite the case widely publicized last year of a woman
in her twenties who was attempting to live at Union Station supporting her-
self on handouts from strangers. She was interviewed by the police and
was befriended by a reporter who took her to a hospital for an evaluation.
Everyone concerned, including a psychiatrist who examined her, agreed that
she was mentally ill. However, -the decision was made that she was not
dangerous to herself or to others. She was not admitted. Several days later
she was found stabbed to death. Dead, she was not able to enjoy the liberty
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pitalization. She "died with her rights on."'s Subsequent discussion in the
psychiatric profession and in the press focused on whether she could have
been considered likely to injure herself. That she was sick and could have
been helped was never in doubt, but this was not the question being de-
bated.
Another example is a delusional divorced mother of three children, living
in a row house, who has come to believe that she is the reincarnation of
Cleopatra. She accuses neighbors of trying to make her stink, leaves gar-
bage in the front of her house, confronts neighbors and passers-by. However,
she is "not dangerous." According to some her behavior should be char-
acterized only as an "annoyance," to be either tolerated or dealt with as
a breach of the peace. Is it in her real best interests to take the latter road
and deal with her on the basis of her misdemeanors, or to take what we
regard in this case as the humanitarian road which involves hospitalizing her,
against her will if this cannot be avoided, so that she can have the treat-
ment which we have every confidence will help her to function more ade-
quately for herself and her children?
A third example is the manic-depressive who on one of his swings into
mania can wipe out his financial resources, his family's security, and his own
dignity in a few weeks of frantic overactivity, but yet cannot be considered
likely to injure himself or others. Would legal means to check his destruc-
tive behavior be as effective as hospitalizing him, again, whether he agrees
or not, so that he can be treated? Mania is one of the illnesses for which
rapid and effective treatment is available. What is humane in not insisting
on treatment?
In all the above instances, effective treatments are available. It is a per-
version and a travesty to deprive these needy and suffering people of treat-
ment in order to preserve a liberty -which is in actuality so destructive as
to constitute another form of imprisonment.
In our opinion, the change in attitudes toward involuntary hospitalization
has gone so far in the direction of rectifying abuses against personal liberty
that -there is now a danger of neglect of the real best interests of both the
patient and the public. We will attempt a brief survey of some currents
in psychiatry that are contributing to the present adverse climate of opinion
about involuntary hospitalization.
8. See Treffert, Dying With One's Rights On, 224 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-





At the beginning of the 19th century an idea arose that, on humanitarian
grounds, the mentally ill ,should be placed in a kind and moral setting. Later,
it was also noted that many of those who were so treated got better and
could return home. Thus, there developed what has been called "moral
treatment." For a variety of reasons this idea became twisted and institu-
tions arose whose main purpose was to protect society from the patient, as
well as to protect 'the patient from his mental illness. For a century, from
the 1850's to the 1950's, mental institutions became bigger and bigger to
the point where nearly 600,000 people were hospitalized at one time, most
of them on an involuntary basis. Important changes in the 1950's reversed
this trend. First, evidence accumulated that many patients remained hos-
pitalized, not because of the natural course of their illness, but because of
the effect the institution itself had on them. At the same time there were
two developments which enabled hospitals to avoid this "institutionalization"
as it was called: milieu therapy, and especially, the new psychopharmaco-
logical agents. These tools provided hospitals with the means to drastically
shorten hospitalization-for many patients to only a matter of days-and
they allowed the release of a considerable proportion of those admitted prior
to the 1950's. It also became possible for a greater proportion of psychiatric
care to move out of the public mental hospitals, into the private sector's gen-
eral hospitals and physicians' offices, and the public sector's community clin-
ics. These changes since the 1950's have contributed to a growing attitude
among psychiatrists, sometimes open and sometimes subtle, that the purpose
of one's work was to save 'the patient from that ultimate evil, the public
mental hospital. Success bred some haughty attitudes. First England and
later California announced that they were moving rapidly toward abolishing
their mental hospitals. Both reversed themselves, in the case of California
largely because of a significant degree of public protest generated by homi-
cides by released patients.9 However, another consequence of this anti-hos-
pital opinion within the psychiatric profession was increasing support of the
movement to narrow the criteria needed to involuntarily 'hospitalize a pa-
tient.
Another 'historical current has been the humanization of the legal pro-
cedure for involuntary hospitalization, improvement sought and brought
about primarily by psychiatrists. Prior to 1938 in the District of Columbia,
commitment procedure was much like criminal procedure. The patient ap-
9. Patients' Families Protest Liberal Laws on Commitments, Psychiatric News, July
18, 1973; Concern Rises for Patients Released Under California Law, Psychiatric
News, November 7, 1973.
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peared in open court and in effect was charged with being insane. Doc-
tors, friends, and relatives then had to "testify against" the patient. The
reforms were not intended to make it easy to "put people away," but to
provide hospital care without humiliation to his friends and relatives. In the
process of stripping away much of this trauma and humiliation of the old
procedures, the prosecuting attorney was removed. One result of this, surely
unintended and unwelcome to the psychiatrist, was that he alone was left
to represent the interest of the public. True, jury trials can still take place,
but this happens in less than 1% of the cases.10 True, the present procedure
allows the Mental Health Commission to invite concerned relatives, friends
and the police to testify, but only a minority of cases ever get to full Mental
Health Commission hearings." In the event the case does go to the hear-
ings, the actual process tends to require the patient's psychiatrist to compro-
mise his role of concern for the patient by also having to take into account
the effect of the patient's release on relatives, friends and the community
at large.
Treatability as Admission Criterion
Clearly, psychiatrists are unhappy at being thrust into the position of advo-
cate for the judge of public safety. Many of them find involuntary hospitali-
zation an unattractive necessity, not only for the reasons stated above, but
also because they share the general distaste for depriving an individual of
his liberty against his will. They find the care of such patients much more
burdensome than dealing with voluntary patients. Yet we are asking that
the procedure not be abolished, and in fact that the present criteria be ex-
tended. We take this position because we believe, for the reasons we have
given, that it is necessary, humane and life-saving in certain cases. We
would also like to take away as much as possible the stigma attached to
involuntary hospitalization. We believe that one way to do this is to add
to the present criterion of dangerousness the criterion of need for care and
treatment of patients who are so gravely disabled by their illness as to be
unable to make rational judgments about their own best interests. If these
criteria were employed, individuals would be deprived of their liberty not
only to protect themselves and their family against physical harm, but also
because they are in effect helpless, and need care and treatment for
certain conditions we feel we often can do something about. Thus,
we would like to have the need for care and treatment of those severely
disabled by reason of mental illness included along with dangerousness as




a major factor in assessing whether or not a patient should be hospitalized.
The main clinical groups in which these two criteria should interact are as
follows:
1. Delusional patients who may be dangerous to others. Just because it
is difficult to predict the likelihood of dangerous behavior does not change
the fact that an element of danger may be present and that the admittedly
inexact judgment of psychiatrists must be balanced against that danger.
2. Other schizophrenic patients who, while not dangerous, are so disabled
in their social and interpersonal functioning as to be substantially helpless
and subject to damage or mistreatment by others.
3. Manic patients who, while possibly not physically dangerous, are never-
theless sick and destructive of the security and dignity of themselves and
their families.
4. Seriously depressed patients who may commit suicide not as a rational
act or an existential protest, but as a consequence of mental illness.
5. Certain patients with acute organic brain disease who are unable to
care for themselves.
Two other groups occur to us that might be considered. One group, in-
cluding those afflicted with a chronic organic brain disease such as the senile
brain syndrome, might regrettably have to be added to the list since there
may be no other institution available to them. Another group that many
would want to add includes those alcoholics and addicts who are in a tail-
spin of repeated, destructive episodes of overuse of alcohol or drugs.
Right to Treatment
Since we have spoken in favor of treatability as a criterion, we need to touch
on the concept of "right to treatment." Advances in psychiatric treatment
in the 1940's and 1950's spawned the "right to treatment" issue which
emerged in the 1960's and has continued to the present time. So far, how-
ever, this issue has been of concern only in connection with the question
of release of patients who have not been receiving adequate treatment. It
has been, so to speak, a back door issue. We think it is also a front door
issue which should be taken into account at the time of admission. Initially,
the patient was admitted presumably because he was mentally ill and likely
to injure himself or others. More recently this criterion has seemed to drop
out, however, and the hospital is now told that it can hold the patient only
if he is getting adequate treatment. If this is to be as important a test of
whether the patient should remain in the hospital, why is it not equally im-
portant at the point when his admission is being considered? If treatabil-
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ity were a consideration from the beginning, then there would be more pres-
sure on the hospital to justify the hospitalization by providing such treat-
ment. Some will say however that the terms "provide treatment" and "treat-
ability" are not the same. In actuality they are the same. Treatments
should be applied to the treatable, and treatability should be a factor that
is considered in the decision to hospitalize involuntarily.
In one sense, treatability is already a covert criterion. In answering ques-
tions about whether the patient is mentally ill, concern about whether the
patient's condition is going to be changed 'by treatment is sometimes an un-
spoken consideration. The educational system's failures can be dismissed,
some medical specialities' failures can be buried, but psychiatry's failures
may continue in the system for years, using up a hospital's resources and
bringing down a staff's morale. We would suggest that bringing in a treat-
ability criterion would open up communications between psychiatrists and
the legal system and provide an increased candor that would be useful to
all.
Often, of course, whether a patient is treatable is an issue that only can
be resolved after trial. For this reason we would like to see frequent, thor-
ough, periodic reviews of those who are involuntarily hospitalized, with treat-
ability being one of the parameters to be considered in determining the con-
tinuation of involuntary hospitalization. However, we recognize that not all
patients can be helped to a significant degree. For that reason we have
included the need for care of the gravely psychiatrically ill within the need
for treatment criterion.
Shifting the role of psychiatrist from that of a custodian of public safety
to that of the physician treating his patients would not only be advantageous
for the psychiatrist as a practitioner, but it would be a welcome change for
him and for the public as well. We think the patient as well would be bet-
ter off if his hospitalization depended more on the expectation that he was
to benefit from the experience.
Finally, we want to respond to the objection to our proposed criterion
usually voiced by those seriously and legitimately concerned about civil liber-
ties, that it will be difficult to draw the line and that a powerful and po-
tentially repressive weapon will be granted psychiatrists if they can put
someone in the hospital against his will by declaring him mentally disabled
and in need of treatment. This is the "quis custodiet ipsos custodes" issue,
and we do not minimize its importance. One of us has recently published
a paper on this very kind of abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union.12 We
12. Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of Political Dissenters in the Soviet
Union, 11 PSYCHIATRIC OPINION 5-19 (1974).
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do not maintain that American psychiatrists are any more inherently pure
than their brethren of other lands, or that they can always be relied on to
resist pressure.
Rather, our confidence that involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill
under the proposed criterion can be restricted to cases in which it is
prescribed, necessary and potentially beneficial, rests in the American institu-
tions of judicial review. We advocate the strengthening of these institutions
by the following measures:
1. No patient shall be committed for involuntary hospitalization with-
out being represented by a lawyer, either of his own choosing or retained
through the public defender. Parenthetically, and somewhat hesitantly, we
suggest that consideration be given to providing a legal representative of the
public to represent its interest and to relieve the psychiatrist of this role.
2. No commitment should be for an indefinite period. Each case should
be legally reviewed at stated intervals and the hospital should be required
to justify continued involuntary hospitalization on each occasion.
3. Right to treatment cases should vigorously be pursued and should
receive psychiatric support. As we have indicated, we believe a treatability
criterion for involuntary hospitalization will aid efforts in this direction.
The authors of this paper are happy to see the decline in the number
of cases in which commitment of the mentally ill is necessary, and we are
of course in favor of patients entering psychiatric institutions voluntarily. We
believe, however, that there will continue to be an irreducible minimum of
cases where the former procedure is necessary and appropriate. In deter-
mining such cases we advocate the inclusion of a need for care criterion and
consideration of the needs of the gravely disabled, in addition to the dan-
gerousness criterion. With adequate safeguards of the kind described above,
we believe that a proper balance can be struck between the right of a citizen
to remain at liberty and the occasional instance when good sense and hu-
manitarian considerations require that he be temporarily deprived of that
liberty on behalf of his best interests, and those of the community.
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